The following report describes an accident at Seneca Rocks, West Virginia. This is a longer form report than what will be published in the 2024 Accidents in North American Climbing. If you are a Partner Level Member or above, the Accidents book will arrive in your mailbox any day.
The book is filled with examples of good luck and bad—mainly the latter. This tragic accident occurred on the third pitch of a popular route at Seneca Rocks when a climber with three years of experience took an intentional leader fall. The rope was not running over an edge, his gear was in perfect working order, and his belayer made no mistakes. He expected a safe, albeit long fall. Instead, the rope was severed and he tragically fell to his death.
Arthur Kearns, local guide and owner of The Gendarme Climbing Shop and the Seneca Rocks Climbing School, submitted the following report:
On August 5, a party of two started up Simple J Malarkey (3 pitches, 5.7). The top of the second pitch ends in a corner alcove with overhanging rock above. At the start of the third pitch, the leader, Danny Gerhart (24), placed a 0.75 Camalot just above the belay, before attempting to climb up and left. Gerhart encountered a wasp’s nest and stepped back down to the belay. He then stepped down and to the right on the ramp that ends the second pitch. This was the sequence most used by other climbers.
Gerhart was now about five feet away from the belay. He placed a second 0.75 Camalot before moving up and left to a second alcove, about eight feet above and to the right of the belay. Here, Gerhart placed a #3 Camalot in a shallow, slightly flaring pocket. (This piece was found with both extended and non-extended alpine draws attached.) At this point, he removed the second 0.75 Camalot to prevent excessive rope drag.
Gerhart attempted to move up and right from this stance, which is the most used sequence. This crux section requires the leader to move over a roof on a four-foot-high plaque of rock. Though protection is available, the leader cannot see it until they have committed to the crux, and even then, the placement is behind the climber and at waist level. The handholds here could be described as less than inspiring, as water drains onto them from above, adding a polished feel to the rock. Having found no gear, Gerhart stepped back down to the previous stance and discussed options with the belayer. By then, the sun was peeking over the top, making route-finding more difficult. The climbing team discussed options before Gerhart decided to move up and left.
Climbing above the last piece and not finding additional protection, Gerhart called down to the belayer, informing them that he was going to take a deliberate fall (acknowledging it was “going to be a big one”). He then let go and fell around 12 feet before loading the rope. The belayer reported having enough time to take in two to four feet of slack before hearing a very loud “gunshot” as the rope exploded. The belayer never felt the falling climber load the belay, and Gerhart fell approximately 130 feet to the ground.
While numerous climbing parties immediately responded to give aid, the fallen climber passed at the scene.
Evidence points to the rope being cut by the rope-end carabiner (a Petzl Spirit) on the extended alpine draw attached to the #3 Camalot. The carabiner remained attached to the fully extended alpine draw and was situated on a slabby portion of rock just below the Camalot. Fuzzy remains from the rope sheath were found inside the carabiner. No rope sheath material was found on any nearby rock edges or the slabby rock face. Photos from the accident scene show about seven feet of rope extending from the tie-in on Gerhart’s harness. Three to four feet of core was exposed where the rope cut. The individual core bundles were all severed at the same length; this indicates a definitive “cut” versus extended shredding over an edge.
Kearns wrote the following analysis:
How the carabiner cut the rope is difficult to visualize. But here is my attempt to explain it. The rope leaving the belayer moved up through the first piece and past the slightly overhanging rock above. The overhang included a six-to-eight-inch-wide V-slot that likely inhibited the belay strand from moving laterally to the right. At the time of impact, the belay strand of the rope ...
https://americanalpineclub.org/news/2024/9/11/the-prescriptionseptember
